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Introduction 
The pervasive use of geo-location technologies poses new challenges to personal data 
and privacy protection, as they enable third parties to locate and track people and objects 
anywhere and at any time.1 Although geo-location technologies have been part of our daily 
lives for a while, they have been confined largely to short-distance tracking and situations in 
which the user is fully aware that such technologies are being used, such as in the collection 
of tolls, the use of swipe cards on public transport, entry and exit cards to gain access to 
buildings and the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags in library books or 
merchandise in shops. 2  However, the combination of ever-advancing technologies in 
geographical positioning systems (GPS), wireless-fidelity (Wi-Fi) and cellular identification 
has produced much more powerful location-based services (LBS) that can cover large 
distances. Furthermore, these technologies are often embedded in our mobile devices, which 
are connected invisibly and remotely to networks. Michael and Michael point out that such 
overarching location tracking and monitoring across all time and space has pushed us to live 
in a state of ‘uberveillance’, in which surveillance has become constant and embedded, and 
individuals and objects can be automatically located and identified.3  
                                                     
1 Anne Uteck, ‘Ubiquitous Computing and Spatial Privacy’ in Ian Kerr, Valerie Steeves and Carole 
Lucock (eds), Lessons from the Identity Trail (OUP, 2009) 83. 
2 Karl D. Stephan, Katina Michael, M.G. Michael, Laura Jacob and Emily P. Anesta, ‘Social 
Implications of Technology: The Past, the Present, and the Future’ (2012) 100 Proceedings of the IEEE 
1752. For a discussion of RFID, see Marcus R. Wigan & Roger Clarke, ‘Big Data’s Big Unintended 
Consequences’ (2013) 46:6 IEEE Computer 46–53. 
3 M.G. Michael and Katina Michael, ‘Toward a State of Überveillance’ (2010) 29(2) IEEE 
Technology and Society Magazine, 9. 
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In other words, while we as consumers are using these technologies much more 
extensively, they are in turn using us as consumers. Not only do devices such as smartphones, 
laptops, iPads and computer tablets disclose where we are and when and what we are doing, 
they also enable telecommunications companies or Internet service providers to record our 
activities. In revealing the unique combination of the location, time and content of our 
activities, they allow data about us to be sent to others for analysis and for subsequent 
profiling.4 The smart mobile devices that we carry with us have in fact become tools for 
surveillance, yet many of us have embraced them willingly, albeit unwittingly. The potential 
for abuse of personal data and the threats to privacy that arise from government and 
commercial entities using geo-location technologies are enormous. Dobson and Fisher warn 
about the hazards of ‘geoslavery’, whereby a person’s physical location is coercively or 
surreptitiously monitored or controlled by another.5 Litigation and academic debate have 
already emerged concerning the possible violation of the constitutional right to privacy that 
might arise from the government’s use of geo-location technologies for law enforcement 
without a judicial warrant.6 In 2012, the US Supreme Court condemned the use of GPS 
                                                     
4 For larger implications, Katina Michael and M. G. Michael, ‘The Social and Behavioural 
Implications of Location-Based Services’ (2011) 5:3-4 Journal of Location Based Services 121. 
5 Jerome E. Dobson and Peter F. Fisher, ‘Geoslavery’ (2003) (Spring Issue) IEEE Technology and 
Society Magazine 47. William A. Herbert. ‘No Direction Home: Will the Law Keep Pace With Human 
Tracking Technology to Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery’ (2006) 2:2 Journal of Law 
and Policy for the Information Society 409. 
6 This is discussed under protection against search and seizure of the Fourth Amendment of the US 
Constitution and Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. David H. Goetz, ‘Locating 
Location Privacy’ (2011) 26 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 823. Teresa Scassa, ‘Information Privacy in Public 
Space: Location Data, Data Protection and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy’ (2009) 9:2 
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 193. For an overview of legal inadequacies in the US, the 
European Union and Australia, see Katina Michael and Roger Clarke, ‘Location and Tracking of 
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technologies to track the movements of suspects without a warrant, and deemed the practice 
to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.7 Another strand of the 
literature covers the gross breaches of personal data privacy and autonomy that arise when 
consumer profiling is carried out on the pretext of better service planning and more efficient 
advertising and marketing.8 
Adding to the current debate, this article focuses on the personal data and privacy 
challenges posed by private industry’s use of smart mobile devices that provide 
location-based services to users and consumers. Directly relevant to personal data protection 
are valid concerns about the collection, retention, use and accessibility of this kind of personal 
data, in relation to which a key issue is whether valid consent is ever obtained from users. 
While it is indisputable that geo-location technologies serve important functions, especially in 
cases of emergency and rescue,9 their potential use for surveillance and invasion of privacy 
should not be overlooked. Thus, in this study we address the question of how a legal regime 
can ensure the proper functionality of geo-location technologies while preventing their misuse. 
In doing so, we examine whether information gathered from geo-location technologies is a 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Mobile Devices: Überveillance Stalks the Streets’ (2013) 2 Computer Law & Security Review 29.   
7 US v. Jones, 565 U.S. (2012). Peter Swire, ‘A Reasonableness Approach to Searches after the Jones 
GPS Tracking Case’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law Review Online 57. For a general discussion, see James M. 
Thurmana, ‘US Courts Confront GPS Surveillance: Is Maynard a Harbinger of Change or an Anomaly? 
(2011) 5 Journal of Location Based Services 201. 
8 Roger Clarke and Marcus Wigan, ‘You Are Where You’ve Been: The Privacy Implications of 
Location and Tracking Technologies’ (2011) 5 Journal of Location Based Services 135. 
9 Anas Aloudat, Katina Michael, Xi Chen, and Mutaz Al-Debei. ‘Social Acceptance of 
Location-Based Mobile Government Services for Emergency Management’ (2013) 30 Telematics and 
Informatics 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0736585313000051> accessed 30 August 2013.   
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form of personal data, how it is related to privacy and whether current legal protection 
mechanisms are adequate. We argue that geo-location data are indeed a type of personal data. 
Not only is this kind of data related to an identified or identifiable person, it can reveal also 
core biographical personal data. What is needed is the strengthening of the existing law that 
protects personal data (including location data), and a flexible legal response that can 
incorporate the ever-evolving and unknown advances in technology.  
To examine the above issues, Part I of this article defines the meaning of location data, 
and highlights the problems concerning the surreptitious acquisition of location data and the 
equally problematic issue of uninformed consent in the seemingly voluntary disclosure of 
location data in consumers’ increasing adoption of geo-location technologies. Part II identifies 
the legal implications in the personal data protection regimes in the European Union (EU) and 
the US. EU law is an obvious choice in studying this topic, as it is impossible to ignore the 
EU’s comprehensive and elaborate legal scheme of personal data protection, especially its 
extraterritorial effect in requiring an adequate level of protection in countries where the data 
are received.10 In contrast, the choice to study the US approach may be puzzling to some, as 
personal data protection has been described as ‘fragmented’ and often depends on the type of 
                                                     
10 Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such Data. Official Journal L 281, 23/11/1995 P. 0031 – 0050 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML> accessed 
10 September 2013. Rolf H. Weber, Regulatory Models for the Online World (Kluwer Law 
International, 2002) 156. 
5 
 
data and the entities in control.11 Nevertheless, Solove and Hartzog argue that the US 
position is worth studying because of an emerging jurisprudence based on the large number of 
settlement cases and decisions from the Federal Trade Commission, which has played a 
pivotal role in influencing the development of personal data regulations, policies and 
company practices.12 Due to the globalised nature of technology companies, it is necessary to 
understand the US legal landscape. After identifying the loopholes in the present legal 
regimes regarding the protection of location data, the legal reforms proposed by the EU and 
the US are examined to address this issue. 13  In reviewing the challenges posed by 
geo-location technologies and analysing the issues in the current legal debate, we aim to find 
ways to strengthen the existing laws to ensure they protect location data. In this article, the 
terms ‘location data’ and ‘location information’ are used interchangeably, mainly because 
location data is a legal term used in the EU, whereas location information is used in the US.14 
  
                                                     
11 Daniel J. Solove and Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 15 
August 2013 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2312913> accessed 8 September 
2013. 
12 Although the study by Solove and Hartzog focuses on the decisions of the Federal Trade 
Commission, companies have been looking into settlement agreements and law to guide their privacy 
practices and policies. 
13 For the European position, see the European Commission’s ‘Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of Prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such 
data,’ 25 January 2012, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_10_en.pdf> accessed 17 
April 2013. For the US position, see the Location Privacy Act of 2011, S. 1223, 112th Congress 
( 2011-2012) <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s112-1223> accessed 17 April 2013. 
14 For a discussion on the nuances between ‘personally identifiable information’ and ‘personal data’, 
see William B. Baker and Anthony Matyjaszewski, ‘The Changing Meaning of “Personal 
Data”’(International Association of Privacy Professionals Resource Center, 30 September 2010)  
<https://www.privacyassociation.org/resource_center/the_changing_meaning_of_personal_data> 
accessed 21 April 2013. 
6 
 
I.  Geo-location Information, Technologies and Privacy  
A. Location and Geo-Location Information 
The rapid development and enhancement of modern positioning technologies has 
facilitated the collection of location information, making it possible for us to examine various 
aspects of other people’s lives. By the term ‘location information’, we mean any type of data 
that places an individual at a particular location at any given point in time, or at a series of 
locations over time.15 It also encompasses geo-positioning other than latitude, longitude and 
altitude, which can be ascertained with varying degrees of precision.16 A data picture of an 
identifiable individual can be created with the combination of the above location 
information.17 The elements of space, time and content are the core of location information18 
although the descriptive aspect, or the type of location, is the most important and revealing.19 
For instance, by detecting that an individual visits a mosque every week, we may be able to 
infer his or her likely religious affiliation.20 Roger Clarke describes this as tracking the 
                                                     
15 Scassa (n. 6) 193. 
16 Roger Clarke, ‘Person-Location and Person Tracking: Technologies, Risks and Policy Implications’ 
(2001) 14:2 Information Technology & People, 206 at 208.  
17 Scassa (n. 2) 193. 
18 George Cho, ‘Geographic Information Science, Personal Privacy, and the Law’ in John P. Wilson 
and A. Stewart Fotheringham (eds), The Handbook of Geographic Information Science (Blackwell, 
2008) 526-527. 
19 Bennett and Crowe explain that location information has three dimension of being geo-spatial, civic 
and descriptive. While geo-spatial refers to the positioning on the globe through longitude, latitude and 
altitude, and civic refers to the locational coordinates that are provided as a result of political decisions 
concerning borders, it is the descriptive aspect that reveals the immediate type of location that one is in 
or has visited at a certain time. Colin J. Bennett and Lori Crowe, ‘Location-Based Services and the 
Surveillance of Mobility: An Analysis of Privacy Risks in Canada’ A Report to the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada (June 2005) 33 
<http://www.colinbennett.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/OPCREPORTFINAL.pdf> accessed 17 
April 2013. 
20 Mark N. Gasson, Eleni Kosta, Denis Royer, Martin Meints, and Kevin Warwick, ‘Normality Mining: 
Privacy Implications of Behavioral Proﬁles Drawn from GPS Enabled Mobile Phones’ (2011) 41:2 
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 251 at 258 
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‘virtual space’ of an individual, revealing his or her successive interactions with a particular 
organisation.21 Clarke also defines tracking as ‘the plotting of the trail, or sequence of 
locations, within a space that is followed by an entity over a period of time.22 The specific 
term ‘geo-location information’ refers to the information generated by electronic devices that 
can be used to determine the location of the relevant devices and their users.23 This has been 
made possible by the introduction of location-based services (LBS) in wireless mobile 
devices, which allow real-time tracking to be used widely and easily by consumers.24 With 
LBS, location data have gained additional and richer dimensions by readily revealing a 
person’s direction of travel and trajectory, or even his or her predicted movements.25 From 
the above perspective, location information necessarily includes geo-location information. 
 At this point, we may question whether knowing a person’s location or movement in 
public places should be subject to privacy protection, as the individual concerned is already in 
the public arena.26 To understand the relationship between location data, personal data and 
privacy, and the implications of allowing commercial entities to use location data, we need to 
                                                                                                                                                        
<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5599314> accessed 26 August 2013. 
21 Clarke (n. 16). 
22 ibid. 
23 Definition of geo-location information from s. 2601 of the proposed Geolocational Privacy and 
Surveillance Act in the United States, H.R. 1312, 113th Congress, introduced in March 2013 
<http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1312> accessed 31 August 2013. 
24 Bennett and Crowe (n. 19) 32. 
25 Sjaak Nouwt characterises the latter two categories as traffic data and movement data. Sjaak Nouwt, 
‘Reasonable Expectations of Geo-Privacy’ (2008) 5(2) Scripted 375, 376. For the relations on personal 
data and profiling, see Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the 
Profiling Era’ in Jacques Bus, Malcolm Crompton, Mireille Hildebrandt and George Metakides (eds), 
Digital Enlightenment Yearbook (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2012).  
<http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/40> accessed 26 August 2013. 
26 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context (Stanford University Press, 2010) 103-128. 
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understand how geo-location technologies work and the nature of the location data that are 
being revealed.  
 
B. Geo-Location Technologies 
For LBS to work and to determine users’ location requires the involvement of 
geographical positioning system (GPS), cellular identification, Wi-Fi and Assisted-GPS 
(A-GPS) technologies.27   
GPS is dependent on a constellation of 24 satellites to give accurate positional 
information on the four dimensions of latitude, longitude, altitude and time.28 It works best 
outdoors, providing positioning accuracy between 4 and 15 meters.29 However, it is battery 
intensive and inconsistent or unavailable indoors.  
Cellular identification uses the technique of triangulation.30 When a mobile device is 
switched on, it is linked to a specific base station with a unique ID registered to a specific 
location. A mobile device can be located based on the estimation of the direction from which 
                                                     
27 Another common positioning technology, but not the subject matter of discussion of this article, is 
radio-frequency identification which ‘utilizes tags with computer chips containing digital information 
that can used to track and identify humans, animals and inanimate objects.’ Herbert (n. 5), 412 n. 7. It 
is commonly used in tracking products from manufacturers to consumers. Wigan and Clarke (n. 2). 
28 A. Roxin, J. Gaber, M. Wack and A. Nadit-Sidi-Moh, ‚‘Survey of Wireless Geolocation Techniques’ 
in Proceedings of IEEE-GLOBECOM’07, Workshop SUPE’07, 26-30 November 2007, Washington , DC, 
USA. <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4437809> accessed 18 September 
2013.   
29 Janice Y. Tsai, Patrick Gage Kelley, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Norman Sadeh, ‘Location-Sharing 
Technologies: Privacy Risks and Controls’ (2010) 
<http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/LBSprivacy/files/TsaiKelleyCranorSadeh_2009.pdf> accessed 17 April 2013.  
31 Roxin, Wack and Nadi-Sidi-Moh (n. 28). 
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its signal arrives at the base station.31 This method provides a quick indication of location, 
but is only accurate to approximately 50 meters in densely populated urban areas and up to 
several kilometres in rural areas.32  
In contrast, Wi-Fi can locate devices in areas that have become blanketed with both 
personal and public Wi-Fi access points.33 It relies on a unique ID from the WiFi access point, 
which can be detected by a mobile device and sent to a service that provides a location for 
each unique ID. The unique ID for each Wi-Fi access point is its MAC address (Medium 
Access Control), which is recorded in the hardware of the device . Like radio, the Wi-Fi 
enabled devices continuously transmits its own network name and its MAC address so that it 
can be located. While it may not provide as precise a location as GPS, this technology is more 
widely used and can function well indoors.  
Another geo-location technology is assisted GPS (A-GPS), a hybrid solution that can 
speed up the location process. Information about the mobile device is transmitted through the 
network of base stations to speed up the location process, which only takes a few seconds.34 
This combination of GPS and cellular identification technology can resolve the long delays 
that can occur when locating by GPS alone due to obstructions that block the view from the 
                                                     
31 Roxin, Wack and Nadi-Sidi-Moh (n. 28). 
32 ibid. 
33 ARTICLE 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation Services on Smart 
Mobile Devices’ adopted on 16 May 2011 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp185_en.pdf> accessed 17 April 
2013. 
34 Roxin, Gaber, Wack and Nait-sidi-Moh, (n. 28).  
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handset to the GPS satellite.35 However, as the following discussion highlights, many people 
may have embraced these new smart mobile gadgets and new LBS without fully realising 
their invasive potential. 
 
C. Surreptitious Acquisition of Geo-Location Data 
1. Mapping of Wi-Fi Router Location and Harvesting Wi-Fi Data 
Many people have used Google maps to find local businesses and restaurants, get 
driving or walking directions or simply to view maps. Few of them, however, would have 
realised that the location of their mobile devices, through Wi-Fi connections, were also being 
mapped and could easily be found by others on the Internet.36 In 2011, McCullagh reported 
that Google had published the estimated locations of millions of iPhones, laptops and other 
devices with Wi-Fi connections. 37  This was possible because Wi-Fi enabled devices 
(including personal computers, iPhones, iPads and Android phones) with location-based 
services enable regular beaming of their unique hardware identifiers, or MAC addresses (the 
ID number of the Wi-Fi network’s hardware), back to their base stations. Making this 
information available means that it is possible to find the physical address associated with a 
person from their MAC address. Bearing in mind that by June 2011 there were already one 
                                                     
35 ibid. 
36 Declan McCullagh, ‘Exclusive: Google’s Web Mapping can Track Your Phone’ (CNET, 15 June 
2011) 
<http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20070742-281/exclusive-googles-web-mapping-can-track-your-
phone/> accessed 17 April 2013. 
37 ibid. 
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billion Wi-Fi enabled mobile phones,38 the implications for location information collection 
are not hard to foresee.   
Furthermore, according to McCullagh, Google had been harvesting WiFi data and the 
MAC addresses and network SSIDs (the user-assigned network ID name) tied to the location 
data of private wireless networks.39 Google also admitted that it had intercepted and stored 
Wi-Fi transmission data, including email passwords and email content, from their Google 
Street View cars.40 By January 2011, the regulatory authorities in at least 12 countries were 
investigating Google over this matter, 41 and Google’s practice has been condemned in 
various jurisdictions.42 The France Data Protection authority (CNIL) denounced Google 
Street View’s practice of scooping up personal data from Wi-Fi networks and imposed a fine 
of 100,000 euros on the company.43 Google itself admitted collecting 600 gigabytes of data 
from more than 30 countries.44  
                                                     
38 Norman Sadeh, ‘Mobile Location Privacy: Forces at Play, Attitudes and Challenges’ (Mobile 
Commerce Lab, Carnegie Mellon University, 2 June 2011) 
<http://www.ecom-icom.hku.hk/seminar/20110602/Sadeh.pdf> accessed 17 April 2013. 
39 ibid. 
40 See Google’s public acknowledgement: ‘Data collected by Google cars’ (Google Europe Blog, 27 
April 2010) <http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.hk/2010/04/data-collected-by-google-cars.html>; ‘ 
WiFi data collection: An update’ (Google Official Blog, 14 May 2010) 
<http://googleblog.blogspot.hk/2010/05/wifi-data-collection-update.html> accessed 15 May 2013. 
41 EPIC, ‘Investigations of Google Street View’, < http://epic.org/privacy/streetview/ > accessed 17 
April 2013. 
42 An overview of the responses of different countries can be seen from Electronic Privacy Information 
Center, ‘Investigations of Google Street View’ http://epic.org/privacy/streetview/ accessed 21 April 
2013. 
43 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, ‘Google Street View: CNIL pronounces a 
fine of 100,000 Euros’ (CNIL, 21 March 2011) 
<http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/google-street-view-cnil-pronounces-a-fine-of
-100000-euros/> accessed 24 May 2013. 
44 ‘WiFi data collection: An update’ (Google Official Blog, 14 May 2010) 
<http://googleblog.blogspot.hk/2010/05/wifi-data-collection-update.html> accessed 15 May 2013 (see 
note 40 above). 
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In the United States, citizens from 10 different states brought a class action against 
Google Street View in 2011, contending that Google had violated the federal Wiretap Act and 
other related state legislations by intercepting their data packets, including MAC addresses, 
SSID information (Wi-Fi network name), usernames, passwords and personal emails through 
the Wi-Fi system In re Google Inc. Street View Electronic Communications Litigation.45 
Contrary to the belief that the collection of Wi-Fi data was an accident and a technical blunder, 
the court found that back in 2006, Google engineers had intentionally created a data collection 
system that could sample, collect, decode and analyse all types of data broadcast though 
Wi-Fi connections.46 Moreover, it was found that Google had authorised the inclusion of the 
above system, known as wireless sniffer technology, into its Google Street View vehicles and 
patented the process.47 While at the time of writing the full trial of the above case was still 
pending, in 2013 Google paid US$7 million in settlement of a class action brought by 38 
states on a similar issue of unauthorised Wi-Fi data harvesting by Google Street View cars.48 
 
                                                     
45  794 F.Supp.2d 1067, N.D.Cal., 2011. The issue before court at that round was just on the 
preliminary point whether Google was allowed to rely on the exemption clause of s. 2510(16) of the 
Wiretap Act to dismiss the plaintiffs’ motion based on the reason that the data collection was from 
open Wi-Fi networks which are ‘readily accessible to the general public,’ which the court ruled against 
Google on that point. 
46 ibid. See also Roya Nikkhah, ‘Google Apologises for Collecting Personal Web Data’ The Telegraph 
(UK, 15 May 2010 ) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/7727907/Google-apologises-for-collecting-personal-w
eb-data.html> accessed 16 April 2013. 
47 Ibid. 
48 ‘Attorney General Announces $7 Million Multistate Settlement with Google over Street View 
Collection of WiFi Data’ (State of Connecticut, 12 March 2013) 
<http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?Q=520518&A=2341> accessed on 21 May 2013. 
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2.  Tracking through Smart Phone Operating Systems  
Other than Google, Microsoft and Apple have also been found to have acquired location 
data surreptitiously from their customers. For instance, in 2011, a class action was filed 
against Microsoft before the Seattle Court in the US for tracking the location of its mobile 
customers using Windows Phone 7, in direct contravention of customers’ requests not to be 
tracked.49 At the same time, Apple iPhones were also reported to be tracking users, collecting 
their location data (including timestamps) and storing it for up to a year, even when the 
location software was turned off.50 It was reported that the data were also saved in a secret 
file on a device on the iPhone, which was then copied to the owner’s computer when the two 
were synchronised by Apple programmes.51 It is not certain why Apple was storing the data 
                                                     
49 Rebecca Cousineau and others v. Microsoft Corporation, Case 2:11-cv-01438-JCC Document 19    
Filed 10/17/11 < http://static.withinwindows.com/files/uploads/2011/10/Doc19_101711.pdf> accessed  
17 April 2013. In June 2012, Microsoft applied to dismiss the case, in which the Court granted the 
motion to dismiss under the Wiretap Act, Washington Consumer Protection Act, Washington Privacy 
Act, and unjust enrichment claims, but denied it with respect to the plaintiff’s claim under the Stored 
Communications Act. Rebecca Cousineau and others v. Microsoft Corporation, Case 
2:11-cv-01438-JCC Document 38 Filed 06/22/12 
<http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/uploadedFiles/Reuters_Content/2012/06_-_June/gibson_m
icrosoft.pdf > accessed 30 January 2013. 
50 Alasdair Allan and Pete Warden, data scientists and former Apple staff, discovered this hidden 
function in 2011. Charles Arthur, ‘iPhone Keeps Record of Everywhere You Go’ The Guardian (20 
April 2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/apr/20/iphone-tracking-prompts-privacy-fears> accessed 
17 April 2013.  
51 The file is known as consolidated.db. Alasdair Allan and Pete Waren, ‘Got an iPhone or 3G iPad? 
Apple is recording your Moves’ (O’Reilly Radar, 20 April 2011)  
< http://radar.oreilly.com/2011/04/apple-location-tracking.html> accessed 17 April 2013. 
Apple admitted on April 27 that the alleged track did happen. But it maintained that the track was done 
unintentionally and other faults were due to “bugs”. See ‘Apple Q&A on Location Data’ (Apple Press 
Info, 27 April 2011) <http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/04/27Apple-Q-A-on-Location-Data.html> 
accessed 23 September 2013. Apple released an update of iOS in the following May. See  
Chloe Albanesius, ‘Apple Releases iOS 4.3.3 With Location Fixes’ (PCMag.com, 4 May 2011) 
<http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2384903,00.asp> accessed 23 September 2013.  
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or how it intended to use it, but what is certain is that with a simple programme,52 anyone 
(including the owner’s partner, a private detective or a stranger) who had access to a person’s 
iPhone or other Apple device could have discovered the details about the owner’s movements. 
In 2011, Apple was fined 3 million Korean Won (US$2855) by the Korea Communications 
Commission for collecting the location information of users despite their withdrawal of 
consent.53 Although the amount was negligible to a giant corporation, Michael and Michael 
point out that it sent an important warning message to Apple and other tech giants to be 
socially responsible.54 
 
D. Voluntary Disclosure of Geo-Location Data: Full Consent? 
Although often we may be unaware that our devices or our locations are being mapped 
for others to see, and that our data are being secretly collected by others, sometimes we 
voluntarily agree to be the targets of tracking or we may seek to track others. The use of 
tracking as part of location-based sharing in a social context can be a sign to show who one’s 
‘buddies’ are,55 which is seen as essential for self-representation.56   
                                                     
52 Alasdair Allan and Pete Waren, ‘iPhone Tracker’ <Petewarden.github.com/iPhoneTracker> 
accessed 17 April 2013. 
53 This was in violation of Article 15 of the Location Privacy Protection Act of South Korea. Korea 
Communications Commission, Press Release KCC requests Apple and Google to take corrective action 
with regard to their violation of the Location Privacy Protection Act and fines them, 3 August 2011 
<http://eng.kcc.go.kr/user.do?mode=view&page=E04010000&dc=E04010000&boardId=1058&cp=7&
boardSeq=32046> accessed 18 September 2013. 
54 Michael and Michael (n. 4) 129. 
55 Sarah Jean Fusco, Roba Abbas, Katina Michael and Anas Aloudat, ‘Location-Based Social 
Networking: Impact on Trust in Relationships’ (2012) 31:2 IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 39 
<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6213869> accessed 26 August 2013. 
56 Vassilis Kostakos, Jayant Venkatanathan, Bernardo Reynolds, Norman Sadeh, Eran Toch, Siraj A. 
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Seemingly, users of social networking sites have given their express consent to share 
their location information with their ‘buddies’. In practice, however, the scope of consent has 
often exceeded users’ expectations. Although it is common practice for personal data to be 
collected and shared between data users and advertisers, most users are not aware that their 
data are being accessed and shared by unknown third parties.57 The Electronic Privacy 
Information Center in the United States reported that Facebook Places had made users’ 
location data routinely available to others, including Facebook business partners, so that 
Facebook could sell users’ current locations and profiles to stores in their vicinity, which 
could then deliver hyper-targeted advertising to them.58 By default, check-in information on 
Facebook is available not only to the third-party developers of applications that a user has 
authorised, but also to the third-party developers of applications that a user’s friends have 
authorised.59 Another worrying feature is that there is no single opt-out feature to avoid 
location tracking from Places.60 Thus, concerns have been raised on whether there is full 
                                                                                                                                                        
Shaikh, Simon Jones ‘Who’s Your Best Friend? Targeted Privacy Attacks in Location-Sharing Social 
Networks’ in proceedings of Ubicomp 2011, Beijing, China, pp. 177-186 (2011)  
< http://www.ee.oulu.fi/~vassilis/files/papers/ubicomp11.pdf> accessed 17 April 2013. 
57Jennifer M. Urban, Chris Jay Hoofnagle, and Su Li, ‘Mobile Phones and Privacy’ 11 July 2012 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103405> accessed 8 September 2013. The study interviewed 1200 
households in the United States, and 70% indicated that they would not allow cell phone providers to 
use their location data. This was on the basis that the consumers were aware of and given the choice.  
58 The Electronic Privacy Information Center, ‘Facebook Places and Privacy’ August 2010 
<http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/places/> accessed 26 August 2013. See Facebook’s own introduction 
to Places, ‘Who, What, When, and Now...Where’ (The Facebook Blog, 18 August 2010) 
<http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=418175202130> accessed 21 May 2013.  
59 ibid. 
60 According to EPIC, users who do not want their location information revealed to others have to (1) 
disable ‘Friends can check me in to Places’ (2) customise ‘Places I Check In’, (3) disable ‘People Here 
Now,’ and (4) uncheck ‘Places I’ve Visited’. Ibid. Denoja Kankesan, ‘How to Check Out of 
Facebook’s New Personal Locator’ CBC News, 24 August 2010 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2010/08/24/f-facebook-places-privacy.html>. 
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disclosure of information and whether valid consent is ever obtained. 
Computer scientists have also warned about the problem of geo-tagging: the process of 
adding location information to documents that are uploaded online by the users themselves.61 
Freidland and Sommer pointed out that this technology is commonly used, but not all users 
are aware of it.62 For instance, all iPhones include in-built high-precision geo-coordinates 
with all photos and videos taken with the internal cameras. Other major smartphone makers 
also offer models allowing instantaneous uploading of geo-tagged photos, videos and text 
messages onto Flickr, YouTube and Twitter. Other than the fact that users may not know that 
their location information is being shared when they upload their items online, the location 
data that they have uploaded can be used to cross-reference information from other publicly 
available online content, so that the exact addresses of potential victims can be identified to 
mount real-world privacy attacks. Friedland and Sommer were able to use geo-tagged photos 
randomly selected from an online advertisement site, together with information from Google 
Street View, to find out the exact postal addresses of sellers. 63  In addition, with the 
geo-tagging information from photos and Twitter feeds, they were able to find out the address 
of and the places frequented by one particular celebrity.64 This means that even if an 
individual has made a conscious choice not to share his location information, he may still be 
                                                     
61 Gerald Friedland and Robin Sommer, ‘Cybercasing the Joint: On the Privacy Implications of 
Geo-Taggin’ Paper for Proc. USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security, 2010 
<http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/pubs/networking/cybercasinghotsec10.pdf > accessed 16 September 
2013.  
62 ibid. 
63 ibid. 
64 ibid. 
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tagged if his photo is taken by a third party using geo-tagging technology.  
Another concern associated with the use of mobile devices is the rapid explosion of 
‘apps’ and their potential to invade privacy. Apps are games and software applications for 
smartphones and other wireless mobile devices. In 2010, the Wall Street Journal studied 101 
popular smartphone apps and revealed that 56 of them transmitted the phone’s unique device 
ID to other companies, 47 transmitted the phone’s location and five sent users’ age, gender 
and other personal details to outsiders without their consent or awareness.65 Although Apple 
Inc. (which makes the iPhone) and Google Inc. (which developed the Android operating 
system) claimed that they protected users by requiring all apps to obtain permission before 
revealing certain kinds of information, including location-based data, the Wall Street Journal 
study revealed the contrary. The study showed that 45 apps did not provide privacy policies 
for consumers to select. Furthermore, it was found that many iPhone apps had sent users’ 
locations to advertising networks without informing users.66 Equally worrying, a study of 50 
Android apps conducted by The Sunday Times in 2012 found that six companies gave the 
apps’ creators the right to read SMS messages stored on the users’ devices or Sim cards.67 
These companies included Facebook, Yahoo!, Flickr and Badoo. Another app tracked the 
                                                     
65 An example of the last category of apps the popular social networking site MySpace, which sent the 
age, gender, income, ethnicity, parental status and device ID of its users to Millennial Media, a giant 
advertisement network company. Scott Thurm and Yurai Iwatani Kane, ‘Your Apps are Watching You’ 
The Wall Street Journal (17 December 2010) 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704694004576020083703574602.html> accessed 17 
April 2013. 
66 ibid. 
67 Robin Henry and Cal Flyn, ‘Smartphone Apps that Cash in on your Privacy’ The Sunday Times (26 
February 2012) 10. 
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user’s location by means of GPS, see the entire web browser’s history and identify the user’s 
email address and profile.68 If app users knew how much information was being accessed by 
third parties, it is unlikely that they would give their consent.69 
The above figures from the media are alarming because they expose the various aspects 
of privacy invasion through apps and smartphones. First, we now know that location tracking 
by marketing companies is pervasive and invasive. In 2009, even before location-based 
advertising became common practice, online behavioural advertising and targeting had drawn 
the attention of the US Federal Trade Commission. This problem had already prompted the 
Commission to come up with specific guideline for consumer data protection.70 Now, with 
apps and their location-based tracking and powerful personalised targeting, challenges to 
privacy and security have become more acute and intense. Advertising companies claim that 
user data are aggregated and not linked to individuals, and they are only interested in targeting 
phone users by location, type of device and demographic data, yet these companies have in 
fact gathered personal data that could be linked to identifiable individuals.71 As the Wall 
                                                     
68 The app is called Justin Bieber Droid Wallpapers, ibid. 
69 According to a 2012 nationwide survey of 2254 adults by the Pew Research Centre in the US, 54% 
of app users decided not to install a cell phone app after they discovered how much personal data they 
would need to share to use it. Jan Lauren Boyles, Aaron Smith and Mary Madden, ‘Privacy and Data 
Management on Mobile Devices’ Pew Internet Reports, 5 September 2012, 
<http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Mobile-Privacy.aspx> accessed 27 January 2013. 
70 US Federal Trade Commission Staff Report: Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral 
Advertising (February 2009) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf> accessed 17 
April 2013. For further discussion, Dorothy M. Bollinger and Tristram R. Fall III, ‘Current 
Developments in Privacy and Security – Impact of Technology’ 82 Pennsylvania Bar Association 
Quarterly 139 (2011). 
71 The companies interviewed by the Wall Street Journal include Traffic Marketplace, and Mobclix. 
The latter had 25 ad networks with 15,000 apps seeking advertisers. See Thurm and Kane, ‘Your Apps 
are Watching You’ (n 65).  
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Street Journal study showed, the most commonly collected data are the unique device 
identifiers on smart phones set by the phone makers, carriers or makers of the operating 
systems, which cannot be blocked or deleted. Second, in many cases, as revealed in the report, 
smartphone users are not given an ‘opt in’ option for phone tracking, which means users’ 
express consent is never sought. Third, different app companies have different interpretations 
on what qualifies as personal data, and a study for the Future of Privacy Forum in 2011 found 
that 22 of the 30 most popular mobile apps in the US did not have any privacy policy.72 This 
problem should not be underestimated, especially in light of the fact that by May 2009, 
Skyhook Wireless, which provides WiFi positioning for Apple Products and AOL, was 
already receiving 250 million location requests every day.73 It is further estimated that by 
2016, the worldwide mobile app industry will achieve 44 billion downloads.74  
 
E. Wider Implications 
Locating or tracking a person’s whereabouts can be potentially invasive and dangerous, 
which raises valid concerns over whether information concerning one’s location may be 
misused by others. Scholars have also pointed out the potential for abuse in using GPS 
                                                     
72 Future of Privacy Forum, ‘FPF Finds Nearly Three-Quarters of Most Downloaded Mobile Apps 
Lack a Privacy Policy’ 12 May 2011 
<http://www.futureofprivacy.org/2011/05/12/fpf-finds-nearly-three-quarters-of-most-downloaded-mob
ile-apps-lack-a-privacy-policy/> accessed 17 April 2013. 
73 Centre for Democracy and Technology, ‘Location Information is Poorly Protected in the 
Commercial Context’ 2 March 2010  
<http://cdt.org/policy/cdt-testifies-location-privacy> accessed 17 April 2013. 
74 Future of Privacy Forum, ‘Future of Privacy Forum Launches App Privacy Site’ 16 May 2011 
<http://www.futureofprivacy.org/2011/05/26/future-of-privacy-forum-launches-app-privacy-site/> 
accessed 17 April 2013. 
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technologies in social relationships such as parenting, employment, insurance, intimate 
partnerships and online social sharing.75   
In relatively mild cases, the tracking function will facilitate ‘helicopter parents’ to check 
up on their children.76 Employers may also request tracking of their employees. As a research 
experiment, Professor Norman Sadeh of Carnegie Mellon University introduced a programme 
to track his research assistants, to see where they were when they were late.77 Accounts of 
employers using LBS to track their workers (mostly mobile workers such as truck drivers, 
postal workers and couriers) with mobile phones, and of car rental companies and insurance 
companies raising their fees after discovering through mobile devices that their customers had 
violated contractual terms, are well documented.78   
Social tracking may have wider security implications. The general fear is for people’s 
physical safety, such as stalking by third parties. A special report by the US Department of 
Justice in 2009 revealed that there were about 26,000 victims of GPS stalking in 2006, 
representing nearly 10% of stalking victims in that year.79 The use of GPS technologies by 
                                                     
75 Roba Abbas, Katina Michael, M.G. Michael, and Anas Aloudat, ‘Emerging Forms of Covert 
Surveillance Using GPS-Enables Devices’ (2011). 
76 The term is used to describe over-involved parents who like to know where their children are and 
need to check up their children all the time. Jeffrey R. Young, ‘Now You can Track Colleagues and 
Students on Your Laptop’ 55 (25) The Chronicle of Higher Education, 27 February 2009, A15. 
77 Young, ibid. 
78 Bennett and Crowe (n. 19). Katina Michael and Gregory Rose, ‘Human Trafficking Technology in 
Mutual Leal Assistance and Police Inter-state Cooperation in International Crimes’ in From 
Dataveillance to Uberveillance and the Realpolitik of the Transparent Society (University of 
Wollongong, 2007) 241 <http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1559&context=infopapers> 
accessed 3 September 2013. 
79 Katrina Baum, Shannon Catalano, Michael Rand and Kristina Rose ‘Stalking victimization in the 
United States’ (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice 2009) 5 
<http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/stalking-victimization.pdf> accessed 1 September 2013. 
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former partners to kidnap or track their former spouses has caused serious problems.80 One 
problem with over-sharing and the ‘malicious potential of systematic location-based 
search’ 81is the danger of inviting break-ins to one’s property, as illustrated humorously and 
vividly by the site ‘Pleaserobme.com,’ 82 where a stream of updates from various 
location-based networks (including Foursquare and Twitter) show when users check-in 
somewhere, indicating that they are not in their homes.   
As we have seen, the flourishing of geo-location-based technologies has brought new 
challenges to the ecosystem of mobile applications, consumer culture and social media. The 
nature and scope of the information that such technology reveals about individuals is 
troubling, and raises legitimate concerns over privacy and personal data violations. 
 
II. A Study of Legal Regulations: The EU and the US Models 
Some may argue that when individuals are in a public place, they can hardly claim the 
                                                     
80 Justin Schenk, ‘Stalkers Exploit Cellphone GPS’ Wall Street Journal, 3 August 2010 
<http://blogs.law.nyu.edu/privacyresearchgroup/wp-content/uploads/Stalkers-Exploit-Cellphone-GPS-
Mobile-Location-Tracking-WSJ.com_.pdf> accessed 3 September 2013. In Villanova v. Innovative 
Investigations, Inc., 420 N.J. Super. 353, 21 A.3d 650 (2011), the plaintiff sued a private investigator, 
alleging that the investigator had invaded his privacy by having his ex-wife place a global positioning 
system (GPS) in his car to track his movements. The New Jersey Superior Court, however, ruled that 
the plaintiff’s claim of privacy invasion could not cover his movements in public areas. For a 
discussion, see Thomas Garry, Frank Douma and Stephen Simon, ‘Intelligent Transportation Systems: 
Personal Data Needs and Privacy Law’ (2012) Transportation Law Journal 97.81 Gerald Friedland and 
Robin Sommer, ‘Cybercasing the Joint: On the Privacy Implications of Geo-Tagging’ Paper for Proc. 
USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security, 2010  
81 Gerald Friedland and Robin Sommer, ‘Cybercasing the Joint: On the Privacy Implications of 
Geo-Tagging’ Paper for Proc. USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security, 2010  
< http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/pubs/networking/cybercasinghotsec10.pdf> accessed 17 April 2013. 
82 Please Rob Me – Raising Awareness About Over-sharing, <http://pleaserobme.com> accessed 17 
April 2013. 
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protection of their privacy. However, others have defined locational privacy as ‘the ability of 
individuals to move in public space with the expectation that under normal circumstances 
their location will not be systematically and secretly monitored for later use.’83 It also entails 
the significant issue of an individual’s control over the extent of the accessibility and use of 
personal location information, including the sequence of locations.84 What becomes critical 
in this concept of locational privacy is the reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy 
that can be expected when moving in a public place. However, the development of case law is 
highly dependent on the context of each case, and the legal position is far from settled.85 A 
more viable and speedier option, which is the subject of current debate in both Europe and the 
US, is to expand the definition of personal data to include location data.  
 
A. Attempts and Legal Limits of Legal Regulations on Location Data: the EU and the US 
Models  
1. The Regulatory Framework in the EU 
In the EU, the two major governing pieces of legislation on personal data protection are 
the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC)86 and the ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC, as 
                                                     
83 Natural Resources Canada, ‘Geospatial Privacy Awareness and Risk Management Guide for Federal 
Agencies’ 10 (31 March 2010) 
<http://geogratis.cgdi.gc.ca/eodata/download/part6/ess_pubs/288/288860/cgdi_ip_12.pdf> accessed 17 
April 2013. Electronic Privacy Information Centre, ‘Locational Privacy’ 
<http://epic.org/privacy/location_privacy/default.html#Issues> accessed 17 April 2013. 
84 Michael and Clarke (n. 6) 220. 
85 Anne S.Y. Cheung, ‘Rethinking Public Privacy in the Internet Era: A Study of Virtual Persecution 
by the Internet Crowd’ (2009) 2 Journal of Media Law 191. 
86 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data. Official Journal L 281, 23/11/1995 P. 0031 – 0050 
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revised in Directive 2009/136/EC) of the European Parliament and Council. 87  
 
(a) ePrivacy Directive 
The ePrivacy Directive is of direct relevance to the issue of location data. Under 
paragraph 14 of the Preamble, location data  
may refer to the latitude, longitude and altitude of the user’s terminal equipment, to the 
direction of travel, to the level of accuracy of the location information, to the 
identification of the network cell in which the terminal equipment is located at a certain 
point in time and to the time the location information was recorded. 
Furthermore, under Article 2(c) of the ePrivacy Directive, location data is defined as 
any data processed in an electronic communications network or by an electronic 
communications service, indicating the geographic position of the terminal equipment of 
a user of a publicly available electronic communications service.  
Under the above legal regime, public carriers of telecommunications services are 
prohibited from using traffic data for the purposes of marketing electronic communications 
                                                                                                                                                        
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML> accessed 
18 April 2013. 
87 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning 
the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communication Sector 
(Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), Official Journal L 201, 31/07/2002 
P.0037-0047. Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 25 November 2009, Amending Directive 2002/22/Ec on Universal Service And Users’ Rights 
Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the 
Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector 
and Regulation (Ec) No 2006/2004 on Cooperation between National Authorities Responsible for the 
Enforcement Of Consumer Protection Laws. Official Journal of the European Union L 337/11. 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:337:0011:0036:En:PDF > 
accessed 17 April 2013. 
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services or for the provision of value-added services, including location-based services for 
advertising purposes, without the consent of the users (Article 6(3)).88 In addition, location 
data must be made anonymous by the public carriers, or specific types of notice must be given 
to and consent must be obtained from the users, before any processing of personal data 
(Article 9). Users must also be given the opportunity to withdraw their consent at any time 
(Article 9). Another important point to note is that when an entity (whether public or private, 
an individual programmer, major corporation, data controller, data processor or third party) 
places information on or reads information from the terminal equipment of a user, clear and 
comprehensive information must be given and consent must be obtained from the user under 
Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive.89 This means that any entity that places information on 
or reads information from smart devices, including apps, must obtain prior consent.90 This 
consent arguably covers not only the collection or use of personal data, but also any 
information that is being stored or accessed by the entity.91 
                                                     
88 Nancy J King and Pernille Wegener Jessen, ‘Profiling the Mobile Customer – Privacy Concerns 
when Behavioural Advertisers Target Mobile Phones – Part I’ (2010) 26 Computer Law & Security 
Review 455, 464-5. 
89 Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive stipulates that ‘Member States shall ensure that the storing of 
information, or the gaining of access to information already stored, in the terminal equipment of a 
subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned has given his or 
her consent, having been provided with clear and comprehensive information, in accordance with 
Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia, about the purposes of the processing. This shall not prevent any 
technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication 
over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order for the provider of an 
information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide the service.’ 
90 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 02/2013 on Apps on Smart Devices’ (adopted 
27 February 2013)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/20
13/wp202_en.pdf> paragraph 3.1, accessed 17 April 2013. 
91 Ibid. This interpretation of Article 29 Working Party has raised concerns for creating cumbersome 
burden on the industry that may inhibit growth and innovation in the mobile app industry in Europe. 
Saira Nayak, ‘Response to EU Opinion on Mobile Apps’ Truste Blog, 14 March 2014 
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Despite the above seemingly adequate protection given to users regarding the use of 
location data by third parties in the EU, the ePrivacy Directive binds only public electronic 
communication services and networks (telecom operators) (Article 2). In other words, in the 
context of regulating the processing of location data in relation to geo-location technologies, 
the ePrivacy Directive applies only to the processing of base station data by public 
telecommunications service providers, and by those telecom operators that offer hybrid 
geo-location services based on the processing of other types of location data, including GPS 
or WiFi data.92 
Companies that are defined as ‘information society services’ are excluded from the 
above legal framework.93 Hence, when a user chooses to transmit GPS data over the Internet, 
the telecommunication service provider is merely acting as a conduit, as the GPS signal is 
                                                                                                                                                        
<http://www.truste.com/blog/2013/03/14/response-to-eu-opinion-on-mobile-apps/> accessed 17 April 
2013. 
92 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation Services on Smart 
Mobile Devices’ (adopted 16 May 2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp185_en.pdf>, paragraph 4.1 
accessed 17 April 2013. For a discussion of an alternative non-legal techno-regulatory regime, see Bibi 
van den Berg, and Ronald E. Leenes, ‘Abort, Retry, Fail: Scoping Techno-Regulation and other 
Techno-effects’ in M. Hildbrandt and A.M.P. Gaakeer, eds., Human Law and Computer Law: 
Comparative Perspectives (Dordrecht, Heidelberg: Springer, 2013) 67-87. 
93 Under Article 2(c) of Directive 2002/21/EC, an ‘electronic communications service’ is defined as a 
service normally provided for remuneration, which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of 
signals on electronic communications networks, including telecommunications services and 
transmission services on networks used for broadcasting, but excluding services providing, or 
exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and 
services; it does not include information society services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC, 
which do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications 
networks. DIRECTIVE 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 
on a Common Regulatory Framework For Electronic Communications Networks And Services 
(Framework Directive). Official Journal of the European Communities L 108/33. 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:108:0033:0033:EN:PDF> 
accessed 17 April 2013. 
26 
 
transmitted at the application level of Internet communication.94 Following this framework, 
web-based LBS providers and companies that provide location services and applications 
based on GPS and WiFi data may fall outside the regulatory framework of the ePrivacy 
Directive. Cuijpers and Pekarek rightly criticise that the aforesaid distinction between public 
and private networks has become diffused and causes confusion to the regulatory 
framework.95  
 
(b) Data Protection Directive 
Even if the ePrivacy Directive may not be applicable to every case of location data 
protection, the Data Protection Directive can provide a fall-back. The latter carries specific 
provisions related to the processing of personal data, covering the collection, retention, use 
and disclosure of data, among other aspects. Under the Data Protection Directive, personal 
data refers to ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’, 
including those that can be identified directly or indirectly, ‘in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity’. Recalling our earlier definition of location data 
(mentioned in Part IA) as ‘any data which places one at a particular location at any given 
point in time, or at a series of locations over time’, it is only logical to conclude that location 
                                                     
94 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, above n. 92, para 4.2.1. 
95 Colette Cuijpers and Martin Pekarek, ‘The Regulation of Location-Based Services: The Challenges 
to the European Union Data Protection Regime’ 5 Journal of Location Based Services (2011) 223, 230. 
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data form part of personal data.  
This stance is also consistent with the position of Article 29 of the Data Protection 
Working Party on why location data should be considered as personal data under the EU 
regime.96 First, the Article 29 Group points out that location data are linked directly to a 
person because the telecom operator that provides the global system for mobiles (GSM) and 
mobile Internet access has a record of the name, address and banking details of every 
customer. Second, location data are also linked indirectly but inextricably to the users of 
mobile devices through a combination of the unique numbers associated with each device, 
such as the IMEI and the MAC address of smart mobile devices.97 If the above arguments are 
accepted, prior informed and specific consent must be sought from users before such data can 
be collected and processed (Articles 7-10 of the Data Protection Directive). 
 
(c) Proposed General Data Protection Regulation  
The above debate on whether location data should be regarded as personal data may be 
                                                     
96 The Article 29 Working Party was set up under article 29 of the EU Data Protection Directive. It is 
composed of representatives from the EU member states’ data protection authorities, the European 
Data Protection Supervisor and the European Commission. Ibid, para 4.2.2. 
97 Ibid. IMEI stands for International Mobile Equipment Identity number. It is a 15-digit number that 
uniquely identifies the device on the cellular network. IMEIs are primarily useful for tracking stolen 
devices, and are often re-purposed as user IDs in mobile applications. In 2011, Website security 
company Dasient found examples of PC-based tracking techniques getting extended in a troublesome 
way to Internet-connected mobile devices. It analysed 10,000 free mobile apps that enable gaming, 
financial services, entertainment and other services on Google Android smartphones, and found that 
more than 8%, or 842, of the Android apps took the unusual step of asking users’ permission to access 
the handset’s IMEI number. The IMEI was then employed as the user ID for the given app. In a 
number of instances, the app subsequently forwarded the user’s IMEI on to an online advertising 
network. Dasient Blog, ‘Hashing IMEI Numbers Does Not Protect Privacy’ (26 July 2011) 
<http://blog.dasient.com/2011/07/hashing-imei-numbers-does-not-protect.html> accessed 5 September 
2013. 
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readily resolved if the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the 
Regulation) proposed by the European Commission is adopted in the near future. 98 In 
January 2012, the European Commission announced a comprehensive set of reforms on data 
protection. One important proposal was to replace the Data Protection Directive with the 
Regulation.99 Under Article 4 of the proposed Regulation, the meaning of ‘personal data’ is 
simplified to mean ‘any information relating to a data subject’. The meaning of ‘data subject’ 
is amended to  
an identified natural person or a natural person who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, by means reasonably likely to be used by the controller or by any other 
natural or legal person, in particular by reference to an identification number, location 
data, online identifiers or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, 
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that person. 
Privacy experts have welcomed the proposed changes.100 Costa and Poullet argue that 
the current definition of personal data under the Data Protection Directive is heavily 
dependent on ‘nominative identification’;101 that is, whether one person can be distinguished 
from others by reference to personally identifying information such as identification numbers, 
                                                     
98 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation)’ 25 January 2012,  
< http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf > accessed 
17 April 2013. 
99 Luiz Costa and Yves Poullet, ‘Privacy and the Regulation of 2012’ (2012) 28 Computer Law & 
Security Review 254. 
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names, addresses and health and financial data. Yet they forcefully argue out that the 
advancement of modern technology allows the contacting, profiling and identification of 
individuals without any need to resort to any of the nominative data.102 For instance, profiling 
technology enables consumers to be identified individually based on their browsing behaviour, 
purchasing habits and the geographic location data generated by their mobile devices.103 In 
the specific context of location data, studies by computer scientists have also shown that 
individuals can be identified easily from anonymised or aggregated data sets because human 
mobility patterns are largely predictable and non-random.104 Given the large amount of 
information that can be inferred from location data, this finding has important implications for 
personal data and privacy protection. In light of the above, the expanded definition of 
personal data under the proposed Regulation as ‘any information relating to a data subject’ is 
indeed most sensible. 
Under the proposed Regulation, personal data must be ‘processed lawfully, fairly and in 
a transparent manner in relation to the data subject’ (Article 5a). Although clearer guidelines 
are needed on what specific information must be given to data subjects to satisfy the 
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104 Computer scientists at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Catholic University of 
Louvain studied 15 months’ worth of anonymised mobile phone records for 1.5 million individuals, 
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requirement of ‘transparency’, the proposed model is moving in the right direction of vesting 
more control back to the users and granting them genuine choices over the use of their 
location data.  
 
2. The US Regulatory Framework 
(a) Federal Law  
In contrast to the EU model, there is no federal law in the US that addresses the specific 
problem of location data or regulates the use of geo-location technologies to protect 
consumers.105 The two principal pieces of legislation covering the commercial industry are 
the Communications Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. However, both of 
these are limited in scope due to the specific carriers that they aim to regulate. 
 
(1) The Communications Act: CPNI 
Arguably, the consumer proprietary network information (CPNI) rules of S. 222 of the 
Communications Act (also known as the Telecommunications Act of 1996) protect location 
                                                     
105 For the legal position on the state’s authority to use location information and to use tracking devices 
at both the federal and state levels, see Rainey Reitman, ‘New Bill Would Ensure Law Enforcement 
Gets a Warrant Before Reading Email’, Electronic Frontier Foundation, 8 March 2013  
<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/03/new-bill-would-ensure-law-enforcement-get-warrant-reading-
email> accessed 20 April 2013. ‘Locational Privacy’ Electronic Privacy Information Center 
<http://epic.org/privacy/location_privacy/>accessed 20 April 2013. For the implications of the First 
Amendment and the Fourth Amendment on surveillance and location data, see Andrew Crocker, 
‘Trackers that Make Phone Calls: Considering First Amendment Protection for Location Data’ 26:2 
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology (2013) 
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information.106 This is because under S. 222(f), telecom carriers must obtain express consent 
from consumers before they can disclose location information to any third party, except in 
emergency situations.107 However, like the e-Privacy Directive in Europe, the CPNI rules 
only bind telecommunications carriers and providers of interconnected VoIP service.108 This 
renders technologies that determine a person’s location independent of the carrier, such as 
Wi-Fi and apps, outside the scope of the regulation.  
Furthermore, in the case of US West Inc. v. FCC,109 the federal district court held that 
telephone records held by a telecom carrier are protected commercial speech under the First 
Amendment, for which consent could be obtained in an opt-out regime. Applying this case to 
the present context may mean that carriers do not need to obtain express opt-in consent from 
customers to share their location data or use it for marketing purposes. This position is 
woefully inadequate for protecting users’ location data because many users, as explained 
above, are not aware that they or their devices are being mapped, tracked or tagged.  
Finally, even when a telecommunications carrier is involved in providing LBS, CPNI 
                                                     
106 CPNI refers to (A) information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, 
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rules may not apply because the Federal Communications Commission has refrained from 
applying Title II of the Communications Act, including the CPNI rules, to wireless broadband 
services.110 
  
(2) Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
Likewise, the scope of the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 
suffers from the same problem of being overly dependent on the forms of providers to be 
regulated. 111  The ECPA was enacted in 1986 before the age of the Internet and the 
widespread use of geo-location technologies. Although Title II (§2701- §2712, also known as 
the Stored Communications Act) of the ECPA protects the privacy of consumers,112 its scope 
only covers providers of electronic communications services and providers of remote 
computing services.113 The aim of the statute is to protect the communication privacy of 
customers in the form of electronic storage, defined as ‘any temporary, intermediate storage 
of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof’.114 
                                                     
110 Federal Communications Commission, Legal Framework, 
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111 18 U.S.C.  
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The focus of the statute is to protect content-based communications.115 In contrast, under 
§2702(c)(6), providers are allowed to disclose non-content information to anyone, 116 
including a person’s name, address and communication records.  
The above shortcomings of the ECPA in protecting consumers’ data in today’s 
technological society are evident in the case of In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation.117 
The dispute concerned a class action against the defendant company for placing cookies on 
the hard drives of users so that it could collect, compile and analyse information that enabled 
it to deliver targeted online advertising. It was contended that the process involved 
unauthorised access to data, which was against the ECPA. The New York District Court ruled 
that the defendant company had not violated the ECPA because the cookies were permanently 
installed in the plaintiffs’ computers, whereas the ECPA restricted unauthorised access only to 
communications in ‘temporary, intermediate storage’.118 Daniel Solove points out that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
electronic transmission thereof; and 
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for the purposes of 
backup protection of such communication. 
115 18 U.S.C., S. 2702(a) 
116 S. 2702(c) stipulates that a ‘provider described in subsection (a) may divulge a record or other 
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of 
communications covered by subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2)): 
(1) as otherwise authorised in section 2703; 
(2) with the lawful consent of the customer or subscriber; 
(3) as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or 
property of the provider of that service; 
(4) to a governmental entity, if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger 
of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of information 
relating to the emergency; 
(5) to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, in connection with a report submitted 
thereto under section 2258A; or 
(6) to any person other than a governmental entity.’ 
117 154 F. Supp. 2d 497. 
118  Section 2510(17) of the ECPA defines ‘electronic storage’ as: 
‘(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the 
electronic transmission thereof; and 
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decision shows that the statute is outdated and ill-tailored to address the prevalent practice of 
information gathering by the private sector in the Internet age.119 Applying the same legal 
logic to apps installed on users’ mobile devices, it is unlikely that users could claim personal 
data protection against unauthorised access and sharing of data. 
 
(3) Further Limitations 
Frustrated by the location privacy protection in the US under the Telecommunications 
Act and the ECPA, Senator Al Franken described the legal landscape as a ‘confusing 
hodgepodge of regulation’.120 He vividly illustrated the problem using the example of a 
person who uses his smartphone to place a phone call to a business, in which that person’s 
wireless company cannot disclose his location information to a third party without his prior 
consent. However, when the same person uses the same phone to look up that business on the 
Internet, his wireless company can disclose his location to anyone without legal 
repercussions.121  
Due to the lack of a clear legal regulatory stance on location privacy in the US, it is 
                                                                                                                                                        
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for the purpose of 
backup protection of such communication.’ In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 
497, 511. 
119 Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person (New York University Press 2004) 69. 
120 Senator Al Franken, The Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011 (S. 1223) Bill Summary 
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common to see a patchwork of different responses from the industry. While it is common for 
service providers to provide users with a choice of privacy settings, the set of options and 
their defaults tend to differ.122 For example, YouTube uses geo-information from uploaded 
videos by default, while Flickr requires explicit opt-in.123 Similarly, Apple’s iPhone geotags 
all images taken with the internal camera unless the function is specifically disabled, whereas 
Android-based phones require users to turn the function on.124 
 Another problem is the discretionary enforcement of the law. In 2011, the US Federal 
Trade Commission was confronted with the first case involving the use of apps in the alleged 
violation of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act. 125  It was found that W3 
Innovations, through its Broken Thumbs app, had been collecting and disclosing personal 
information from tens of thousands of children under the age of 13 without prior consent from 
their parents. Eventually, the case was settled, with the company agreeing to pay a US$50,000 
penalty and to delete all of the personal information, including email addresses, that they had 
collected from children. 
 
(b) State Attempt: California Online Privacy Protection Act 
While different states have tabled different Location Privacy Bills to establish a warrant 
                                                     
122 Friedland and Sommer (n. 61), 2. 
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requirement for the authorities to use location information,126 California remains the only 
state that has implemented personal information and privacy policies to protect consumers in 
the use of mobile applications and websites. 
Under Section 22575(a) of the California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA),127 
‘an operator of a commercial Web site or online service that collects personally identifiable 
information through the Internet about individual consumers residing in California who use or 
visit its commercial Web site or online service shall conspicuously post its privacy policy on 
its Web site.’ Under S. 22577(b), the definition of personally identifiable information is any 
‘individually identifiable information about an individual consumer collected online by the 
operator from that individual and maintained by the operator in an accessible form.’128 
Section 22577(b) meticulously elaborates what is meant by ‘conspicuously posting’. 
Regarding the imposition of penalties, each violation may carry a fine of up to US$2500. 
The CalOPPA is expected to be enforced through California’s Unfair Competition Law (the 
‘UCL’), which is within the Business and Professions Code (ss17200-17209). Under the UCL, 
the California Attorney General, district attorneys and some city and county attorneys can file 
suits against businesses for acts of ‘unfair competition’, which are considered to be any act 
                                                     
126 These include Texas, Maryland and California. ‘Locational Privacy Electronic Privacy Information 
Center’ <http://epic.org/privacy/location_privacy/ > accessed 20 April 2013. 
127 The Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575-22579 (2004). 
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involving business that violates California law.  
In 2012, the Attorney General Office of California brought a lawsuit against Delta Air 
Lines for violating the CalOPPA by failing to conspicuously post its privacy policy for Delta 
applications and failing to inform users what personally identifiable information was collected 
and how it was being used.129 In the same year, the Attorney General also sent warning letters 
to about 100 mobile app operators concerning their non-compliance with the law.130 
Although the CalOPPA is likely to cover location information, the requirements of the 
notification of privacy policy are relatively lax. At best, users can find out the information 
easily; however, they do not have the choice to opt out of the regime, let alone to express their 
explicit consent or objection. 
 
(c) Proposed Reform 
 Legal rules have been proposed in the US in response to the uncertain and 
unsatisfactory state of protection on location privacy protection.  
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(1) Location Privacy Protection Act 
In June 2011, the Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011 (S. 1223) was tabled before 
Congress by Senator Al Franken.131 Under Section 2 of the bill, geo-location information is 
defined as any information  
concerning the location of an electronic communications device that …is generated by 
or derived from the operation or use of the electronic communications device; and that 
may be used to identify or approximate the location of the electronic communications 
device or the individual that is using the device,  
but ‘does not include any temporarily assigned network address or Internet protocol address 
of the individual’. The bill specifically addresses geo-location information services, defined 
as ‘the provision of a global positioning service or other mapping, locational, or directional 
information service (Section 3, Clause 2713 (5)). It is intended to cover businesses offering or 
providing services for electronic communications devices, including those offering or 
providing electronic communications services, remote computing services or geo-location 
information services (Section 3, Clause 2713(a)(1)).132     
The proposed legislation has three important implications for future industry practice. 
First, companies must obtain express consent from customers before collecting, receiving, 
                                                     
131 Location Privacy Protection Act, 2011 Congress US S 1223, 112th CONGRESS, 1st Session (June 
16, 2011), Introduced in Senate, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s112-1223> 
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recording or obtaining their location data, and before disclosing such data to any 
nongovernmental third parties (Section 3, Clause 2713(5)(b)). Second, stalking apps that 
allow one person to track another person’s whereabouts surreptitiously will be prohibited 
(Section 3, Clause 2713(5)(c). Third, mobile services must disclose the names of the 
advertising networks or other third parties with which they share consumers’ locations (clause 
2713(3)). The bill was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee at the end of 2012,133 but 
it is likely to take another year of debate before we know whether it will be enacted into law. 
 
(2) Mobile Device Privacy Act 
In 2012, the Mobile Device Privacy Act was introduced to Congress by Senator Edward 
Markey.134 The bill specifically regulates the monitoring of activities by mobile devices: the 
software’s capability to monitor mobile device usage must be disclosed to the user, and the 
user must give express consent to monitoring and other activities.  
Although the proposed Act does not aim to protect location information directly, it 
defines ‘monitoring software’ as  
software with the capability to monitor mobile device usage or the location of the user 
                                                     
133 The bill was passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee on 14 December 2012. The legislative 
process can be checked, US Legislative Information, S.1223 - Location Privacy Protection Act of 2012  
<http://beta.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/1223> accessed 20 April 2013. 
134 Mobile Device Privacy Act, 2012 Congress US HR 6377, 112th CONGRESS, 2nd Session (12 
September 2012), Introduced in Senate,  
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and to transmit the information collected to another device or system, whether or not 
such capability is the primary function of the software or the purpose for which it is 
marketed (Section 7(5)). 
Thus, the collection and transmission of location information is clearly covered by the Act.  
The major focus of the bill is to regulate tracking activity by the industry. It requires any 
seller of mobile devices to disclose tracking software at the time of sale and at the time of 
entry into a contract (Clauses 553(1) and (2) of Title 5, United States Code, Section 2 of the 
bill). Express consent from consumers must be sought before any monitoring software can be 
activated. In addition, consumers must be told the type of monitoring software being installed, 
what information is being monitored and transmitted, the identity of the person or persons 
who will see or share the data, how the data will be used and the procedures the consumer 
must follow to discontinue the monitoring and collecting (Section 3 of the Bill). It would 
require companies to file with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Federal 
Communications Commission, as appropriate, a copy of the agreement under which a person 
receives the information regarding the disclosures required by the Act (Section 4). 
Furthermore, the bill directs the FTC to promulgate regulations requiring (1) the express 
consent of the user before monitoring software starts to collect and transmit information and 
the opportunity for the user to prohibit such collection and transmission at any time; and (2) 
recipients of information transmitted from monitoring software to implement information 
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security practices regarding the treatment and protection of the information (Section 4).  
Violations of the proposed law will incur penalties of US$1000 for each violation, and 
up to US$3000 for wilful or knowing violations (Section 6(e)). However, it is uncertain what 
exactly constitutes a ‘violation’. For instance, if an entity has collected and transmitted a 
person’s personal information without permission several times, it is not clear whether this 
would be regarded as a number of unique violations, or one single violation. Amongst other 
concerns, the bill is being vehemently opposed by the mobile device and app industry.135  
Under the current atmosphere of hostile industry response and a traditional lack of 
protection of personal information, it is uncertain whether the two proposed bills will be 
passed in the US. 
 
B. Ongoing Legal Issues 
In examining the current law and proposed legal developments in the EU and the US, 
we note three areas that are in urgent need of reform to protect location data: (1) expanding 
the scope of personal data to include location data; (2) imposing responsibility on service 
carriers or providers that are technologically neutral; and (3) having a system of transparency 
and obtaining meaningful consent from consumers. 
On the first issue, the recently proposed EU Regulation, which specifically protects 
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location data and adopts a broad and flexible definition of personal data as ‘any information 
of an individual’, is moving in the right direction. As discussed, location data are highly 
predictable, and seemingly anonymous location data can be easily traced to an individual. An 
inclusive definition needs to allow for future non-contemplated technological advancements 
to protect the highly unique nature of location data. 
Second, a technologically neutral approach towards the means of transmission  is 
critical. We have highlighted the shortcomings of the ePrivacy Directive in the EU and the 
federal legislation in the US, which are unnecessarily narrow due to their strict dependence on 
the forms of transmission or forms of providers of the concerned data. Given that laws, once 
passed, ‘are continually eroded by exceptions built into subsequent legislation and by 
technical capabilities that are not contemplated,’136 a piece of legislation is needed that is 
broad enough to include the present or future means of carriers and that will not be quickly 
out-paced by technology.  
Third, both the EU and the US model fail to make clear the degree of transparency that 
should be disclosed to users and consumers, and the level and type of consent that is required. 
Transparency will entail not only informing users and consumers about the specific 
information being collected, how it is being used or shared and how long it is being retained, 
but also notifying them of any security breach. While it is acceptable to allow for exceptional 
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cases that do not require the consent of users and consumers to be obtained, such as in an 
emergency, affirmative opt-in consent should be sought for collecting and sharing location 
data. This issue of consent in different contexts certainly warrants another independent 
research project. Perhaps for now, it is important for us to remember that such consent must 
be freely given in an opt-in regime, that it cannot be bundled with other services but must be 
sufficiently granular at various points in time, yet it must not be unduly burdensome to the 
users.137 
 
Conclusion 
Mobile devices have never been as popular and dynamic as they are today, but our 
investigation into the legal protection of location data has revealed that the law is interacting 
weakly with modern LBS technologies. Not only is the law lagging behind such technologies, 
it also appears to be helpless and lost when faced with the relentless growth of smart mobile 
devices equipped with ever-evolving geo-mapping, tracking and tagging technologies. While 
users are excited about the rapid developments on the techno-highway, they may have lost 
sight of the personal data violations and the surveillance that are being carried out by the 
industry and the market. As many users are not even aware that their data are being captured 
or collected by the industry, they certainly have insufficient knowledge and opportunity to 
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give their consent. Developments in technology and our social practices in the use of location 
data present unique privacy concerns and challenges. 
It is laudable that legal incentives have been introduced in the EU and the US to catch 
up with the challenges posed by geo-locational technology. Fundamentally, however, legal 
provisions are required that address and protect location data directly and specifically. If the 
core principles behind the right to privacy and personal data protection are to protect an 
individual’s self-determination and prevent manipulation by others, we need legal 
intervention that requires consent to be obtained for and that protects the collection, use, 
disclosure and retention of geo-location data. Vigilance is needed to guard not only against 
state encroachment, but also against growing commercial practice.  
